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eastern China. Exposure to H7N9 infected poultry at live bird markets (LBM) was implicated
as the main risk factor for human infection. We aimed to identify the role of LBM biosecurity
indicators and poultry movement in the affected areas.
Methods: A cross-sectional survey was carried out in 24 LBMs at the beginning of H7N9
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tors associated with the H7N9 presence in LBMs and social network and spatial analysis to
quantify the connectivity and geographic variation in the connectivity of poultry movements.
Results: Chickens were the predominant poultry species traded by affected LBMs. The pres-
ence of H7N9 in LBMs was significantly associated with the type of LBM and with LBMs that sold
chicken to other markets. The chicken movements were significantly spatially clustered and
was highest in counties from Jiangsu and Anhui provinces.
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The emergence of a new reassortant influenza A (H7N9)
causing human infections without preceding or concomitant
outbreaks in poultry was quite unexpected.1 The sources of
infection have yet to be fully clarified and a major chal-
lenge for the investigation of sources of exposure is the
fact that poultry do not exhibit clinical signs. Epidemiolog-
ical studies rely on infection data from humans and live bird
markets (LBMs) where infections have been detected. The
key public health concerns about the novel H7N9 virus are
how and where the virus crossed the species barrier and
whether it will further adapt to enable sustained human-
to-human transmission.2
Since the report of the first human H7N9 case in
Shanghai in March 2013, there have been three major
waves of human H7N9 cases in China. The first wave was
observed from March to April 2013, starting from Shanghai,
Anhui, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces in eastern China,
then mainly extended to neighbouring provinces: Henan,
Shandong, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. The second wave was
observed from January to April 2014, affecting initially and
primarily the provinces of Zhejiang province in eastern
China and Guangdong province in southern China, then
extending to Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Hunan and Guangxi
provinces. From May to December 2013 (i.e. the period
between the two waves), there were sporadic human cases
in Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Guangdong,
similar situation during the period from May to October
2014. The third wave began in late 2014, started from
Jiangsu and Xinjiang provinces, then massive affected
Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces in eastern China, as well
as Fujian and Guangdong provinces in southern China.3,4
Exposure to H7N9 infected poultry at LBMs has been
implicated as the main risk factor for human infection and
chickens are considered to be the species with an impor-
tant role in the transmission for H7N9 influenza.5e9 During
the first wave, 82% of the 131 reported human H7N9 cases
had a history of exposure to live poultry, particularly
chickens.10 Available evidence indicates that LBMs can
serve as potential hubs where avian influenza viruses are
transmitted and maintained for prolonged periods of
time.11e14 Surveillance and monitoring activities for avian
influenza within the poultry market chain (i.e. farms, trans-
port, LBMs and slaughter houses) are an important tool to
generate epidemiological evidence on affected species,
geographical sources of infection and the role of modifiable
risk factors on disease transmission.15
Previous studies in Asia have demonstrated the role of
movement of poultry through live bird markets in the
circulation and dissemination of HPAI H5N1 virus.16 Social
network analysis (SNA) techniques can be utilized to build
and analyze the network of poultry movements to help
identify high-risk premises and offer new insights on disease
transmission dynamics, making it possible to develop more
effective strategies for disease control. For poultry marketchain analysis, SNA of poultry movement is used to quantify
the connectivity of sources and markets in the network and
quantify the risk associated with HPAIV H5N1 infection
along the market chain.17 These empirical studies have
demonstrated the value of coupling data on the social
network of the poultry market chain with data on infection
along the market chain to develop risk-based, targeted sur-
veillance of farms and markets.
In March 2013, an early emergency investigation was
carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s
Republic of China (MoA) and this was followed by the
establishment of a joint investigation into the source of the
outbreak. As a result, a large-scale, cross-sectional survey
was carried out from 14 to 19 April 2013 by the Veterinary
Bureau of the MoA, China Animal Health and Epidemiology
Centre (CAHEC) of MoA, and the Emergency Centre for
Transboundary Animal Diseases of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations in China (FAO ECTAD
China).
The study aimed to identify the role of biosecurity
indicators and poultry movement through LBMs in the
presence of influenza A H7N9 within LBMs during the first
wave of H7N9 infection and to examine the spatial variation
in connectivity of counties involved in poultry trade to LBMs
in the four affected provinces during the first wave of H7N9
infection.
Materials and methods
Ethics statement
The research proposal leading to the study received ethics
approval from the CAHEC of MoA. Ethical approval for the
questionnaire survey was obtained from the Division of
Epidemiology Survey within CAHEC who handles the ethics
approval of field studies conducted by their staff in China.
Participation in the questionnaire survey was voluntary and
oral consent was obtained from market managers at all
intervening LBMs. There were no animal samples taken as
part of our study, we used secondary information on market
positivity to H7N9 infection derived from the official
website of MoA.
Data sources
During the emergency response to influenza A (H7N9)
infection in humans, a cross-sectional survey was conduct-
ed in 24 LBMs (15 wholesale markets and nine retail
markets) in the Shanghai provincial-level municipality,
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Anhui provinces from 14 to 19 April,
2013. The 24 LBMs included in the study were selected
purposively based on two criteria: first, we focused on all
LBMs within one kilometer in the adjacency of areas with
reported H7N9 human infections (Fig. 1A), and second we
selected all LBMs that marketed more than 20,000 heads
Figure 1 Geographical distribution of LBMs surveyed, H7N9 human infections and poultry H7N9 positives (A), and live chicken
sources and movement networks included in the study (B). The influenza A (H7N9) human infections (red circle) and poultry pos-
itives (blue circle) were updated till end of May 2013. The network represents the 2-mode binary network (LBM-source network),
with black arrows linking the nine LBMs (yellow circle with a bird inside) and live chickens sources (sea-blue circle) from which
chicken originate.
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the LBMs selected best represented existing production and
LBM marketing systems.
This investigation included data collection on live
poultry movement and market biosecurity. The managers
of the 24 LBMs were interviewed using a standardized,
validated questionnaire to capture information relative to
trade and general market biosecurity measures. The ques-
tionnaires had been used in previous studies by our
team.17,18 About 90% of live poultry are thought to come
through wholesale markets on the way to retail markets.
Some wholesale markets also sell live poultry directly to
the consumer have been defined as mixed markets. Infor-
mation on poultry movements was obtained from poultry
movement certificates available at nine of the 24 surveyed
markets (four wholesale LBMs and five mixed LBMs), and
was recorded for up to three months before the reporting
of the first human case in the province, i.e. Shanghai (1
January to 5 April), Jiangsu (1 January to 4 April), Anhui
(1 January to 15 April) and Zhejiang (1 January to 11 April).
The nine markets were from Shanghai (n Z 3), Nanjing
(n Z 2), Hangzhou (n Z 1), Huzhou (n Z ), Hefei (n Z 1)
and Chuzhou (n Z 1). The poultry movement certificates
recorded the name of the county of poultry sources, poultry
species (e.g. chickens, pigeons, ducks and other types) and
the numbers of poultry transported.
Data on the presence of H7N9 in the 24 LBMs was
available from the official national emergency surveillance
activities conducted during 31 March to 19 April 2013; data
on H7N9 infection in poultry and humans used for mapping
was up to the end of May 2013, both infection data were
extracted from the official website of MoA (http://www.
moa.gov.cn/zwllm/yjgl/yqfb/index_3.htm) andWHO (World
Health Organization, http://www.who.int/influenza/human_
animal_interface/avian_influenza/archive/en/), and geo-
coded based on the reported geographical source of
infection.Social network analysis of live chicken movements
To describe the connectivity pattern within the network
dataset consisting of records of paired trading events
between a particular LBM and the county of origin of the
purchased chickens (termed as “chicken source”), we used
social network analysis (SNA), as described previously.18 We
summarised network connectivity using the number of links
(indicating the frequency of movement), movement length
(representing the catchment area of LBMs), degree central-
ity, k-core and the components of the network. The degree
represents the absolute number of unique links of a given
node; for example a degree of two means that the node
(poultry market or source) is connected with two other
unique markets or sources. The k-core represents the
maximal group of nodes, it describes the connectivity of
different groups in a network; for example, a k-core of
two means that the node belongs to a subgroup within
the network where all nodes are connected to two other
nodes. These two network indicators are important for
describing the levels of connectivity and centrality that
exist between the different elements of a network
and play a key role while identifying the most influentialspreaders within a network.19 The components of the
network include a maximal connected sub-graph where
all nodes (i.e. chickens sources) are connected through
paths.
We built one 2-mode binary network (LBM-source
network), linking the nine LBMs and chickens sources. The
centrality measures at node level (such as the degree and
membership of the giant component) have been suggested
to be of practical use in the development of effective
targeted disease control strategies. The 2-mode LBM-
source network was converted into two separate 1-mode
binary symmetric networks: one 1-mode binary symmetric
network of source nodes linked via a common LBM (sour-
ceesource network) and a 1-mode binary symmetric
network of market nodes linked via a common county
(marketemarket network). All social network analyses
were performed using UCINET 6.216 (ªAnalytic Technolo-
gies). All maps were produced using ArcGIS 10.1 (ªESRI).
Analysis of spatial variation in the connectivity of
poultry sources
To assess whether there was spatial correlation in the
observed pattern of degree centrality and k-core among the
live chickens sources (sourceesource network) in the study
area we used the Global Moran’s Index (Moran’s I), a mea-
sure of spatial autocorrelation for spatially aggregated
data. Moran’s I is positive when nearby areas tend to be
similar, negative when they tend to be dissimilar, and
approximately zero when attribute values are arranged
randomly and independently in space.20 The estimate of
Moran’s I value and a Z-score evaluating the significance
of the index were estimated using ArcGIS 10.1.
Associations between biosecurity indicators and
H7N9 infection status in LBMs
A full range of biosecurity indicators were examined for all
the 24 LBMs (Supplementary Table 1). The association be-
tween LBM biosecurity attributes and infection status
(H7N9 presence in the LBM as reported by official reports)
was examined for the 24 LBMs with biosecurity data. The
biosecurity attributes included market type (wholesale vs.
retail markets), waste disposal, manure processing, market
disinfection, and market cleaning and trade destination.
Firstly, all LBM biosecurity attributes were initially
screened for association with market node infection status
using univariate statistical analysis based on P < 0.05 when
applying the Fisher’s exact test (Stata/SE 12.0 ªStataCorp).
Secondly, the association between LBM attributes associ-
ated with H7N9 infection status of LBMs and other LBM bio-
security practices were examined.
Results
Social network analysis of live chicken movements
Our results show that live chickens were the main poultry
species being traded in the main markets of the affected
areas. The results indicate that chicken production in
474 X. Zhou et al.Shanghai and Zhejiang could not meet their local consump-
tion demand, and Jiangsu and Anhui were their main
supplementary chicken sources (Supplementary Table 2).
LBMs in Anhui mainly traded chicken from sources in the
same province (55%), Shandong (21%) and Jiangsu (20%)
provinces. Similarly, LBMs in Jiangsu traded poultry from
sources in the same province (72%) and Anhui (28%)
province.
The full extent of the 2-mode network is presented in
Fig. 1B. The results of this analysis reveal that there was a
giant weak component comprising nine LBMs and 102
chicken sources. Our results indicate that five (55.6%)
LBMs had a degree centrality greater or equal to 10. Among
LBMs surveyed, we found that eight (89%) had a k-core of 3
and one (11%) had a k-core of 2. The degree centrality of
wholesale LBMs was significantly higher than mixed LBMs,
p Z 0.037, 95% CI (1.97, 32.97). The catchment area of
wholesale LBMs was much larger than mixed LBMs. The fre-
quency of poultry movements (as measured by the number
of links) to the wholesale LBMs was higher than mixed LBMs.
Among chickens sources captured in our survey, we found
that the majority (68.6%; n Z 70) of chickens sources had
a degree and k-core of 1. We found that the mean degree
centrality and k-core estimates of LBMs were larger than
for chicken sources.
Geographical variation in degree centrality and k-
core of poultry sources
This analysis indicated that the counties with the highest
degree centrality were located in the provinces of Anhui
and Jiangsu. The counties with highest degree centrality
were Nanling, Changfeng, Quanjiao, Chaohu, Guangde
counties in Anhui province and Changzhou, Lishuiqu, Haian,
Jiangyan, Dafeng counties in Jiangsu province (Fig. 2A).
The counties with highest k-core (Z36) were widely
distributed across Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan and Shandong
provinces and were all connected with each other through
the LBMs (counties in red group) The area with the lowest
k-core (dark green group) was located in Shanghai
(Fig. 2B). The spatial pattern of degree centrality and k-
core of live chicken sources indicated significant spatial
clustering of county-specific degree centrality and k-core
in that the Moran’s I value was positive and the Z score
greater than 1.96, both statistically significant at the 0.05
level (Supplementary Table 3).
Biosecurity of live bird markets and H7N9 positivity
From all the list of biosecurity indicators (Supplementary
Table 1), only two factors were found significantly associ-
ated with the presence of H7N9 in the surveyed markets:
type of LBMs (i.e. retail, wholesale or mixed) (P Z 0.046)
and whether the LBMs sold poultry or not to other LBMs
(P Z 0.041) (Table 1).
We also found significant variability in biosecurity in-
dicators between different types of LBMs (Table 2). The
market level biosecurity indicators that statistically associ-
ated with different types of LBMs were: type of poultry sold
(P Z 0.013), sell live duck (P Z 0.039), waste hauled in
trash (PZ 0.016), market disinfection (PZ 0.043), marketclosure (P Z 0.028), sell poultry to other LBMs (P Z 0.0)
and sell poultry directly to consumers (P Z 0.047).
Our results indicate that the biosecurity indicators that
associated with selling poultry to other LBMs were: type of
poultry sold (PZ 0.001), waste hauled in trash (PZ 0.019),
market disinfection (P Z 0.031) (Table 3).Discussion
This study presents evidence in support of the role that LBM
poultry movement and biosecurity have played in the
seeding of H7N9 infection during the early stages of the
first wave of H7N9 infection in LBMs of affected areas in
eastern China. The findings of this study also extend
previous SNA studies by specifically investigating the
geographical variation of the relative connectivity of
chicken sources to areas known to have had significant
clustering of human infection.
Early emergency investigations and findings from the
implementation of the national surveillance and investiga-
tion plans have shown that LBMs were likely to play an
important role in disease transmission.6 Our findings
demonstrate that the predominant poultry species being
traded in the LBMs involved in the first wave of H7N9 infec-
tion were live chickens. Prior to mandatory market closure,
most live chickens were transported to wholesale LBMs and
further to retail LBMs to satisfy cultural and consumer pref-
erences for live chicken, and slaughter usually occurred at
LBMs with some being taken for slaughter at home or in
restaurants.
Epidemiological evidence from previous researches in-
dicates the indirect transmission via fomites (i.e. equip-
ment, the movement of vehicles during chick delivery)
plays an important role in the potential transmission and
spread of AI viruses between premises.21e24 Our previous
studies in South China demonstrated the utility of collect-
ing poultry movement data to understand the epidemiology
of avian influenza of the H5N1 subtype in China.17,18 Utiliz-
ing the materials and data collection protocols from our
previous network studies in South China, the joint investi-
gation teams collected poultry movement data from LBMs
in the H7N9 infection areas of the first wave. We described
the connectivity of poultry trade using the k-core (de-
scribes the connectivity of different groups in a network)
and the degree centrality (describes the connectivity of in-
dividual poultry sources).
These measures can theoretically reflect the spread of
an infection through a poultry network; using k-core as an
example, any poultry moved from an infected source can
result in the infection of all linked nodes with a maximum
k distance.17 Therefore it is important to identify the loca-
tion of the subgroup chicken sources with the highest con-
nectivity (k-core and/or degree centrality) in order to assist
in the selection of areas for a targeted risk-based of surveil-
lance and targeted control. Our results indicate that the
counties of Nanling, Changfeng, Quanjiao, Chaohu,
Guangde in the province of Anhui and Changzhou, Lishuiqu,
Haian, Jiangyan, Dafeng in the province of Jiangsu are the
locations with the highest poultry trade connectivity (as
measured by the degree centrality and k-core). Our findings
also showed significant spatially clustering in terms of
Figure 2 Geographical distribution of the degree centrality (A) and k-core (B) of live chicken sources (county level), based on a 1-
mode network of chicken sources.
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suggests these area are epidemiologically significantly
correlated.Furthermore, our study demonstrates the presence of a
geographic overlap between the locations with the highest
connectivity of live chickens sources and the primary
Table 1 Market level biosecurity indicators associated with “market H7N9 infections”.
Market level biosecurity indicators Market H7N9 infection status
No
N (row%, col%)
Yes Total Fisher’s
exact test
Type of LBMs
Retail 9 (100, 47.4) 0 (0, 0) 9 (100, 37.5)
Wholesale 3 (50, 15.8) 3 (50, 60) 6 (100, 25)
Mixed 7 (77.8, 36.8) 2 (22.2, 40) 9 (100, 37.5)
Total 19 (79.2, 100) 5 (20.8, 100) 24 (100, 100) 0.046
Sell poultry to other LBMs
No 11 (100, 57.9) 0 (0, 0) 11 (100, 45.8)
Yes 8 (61.5, 42.1) 5 (38.5, 100) 13 (100, 54.2)
Total 19 (79.2, 100) 5 (20.8, 100) 24 (100, 100) 0.041
476 X. Zhou et al.cluster of H7N9 human infections.25 This geographical over-
lap occurs in an area straddling the boundaries of the prov-
inces of Anhui and Jiangsu. An analysis of the data from the
first wave of H7N9 human infections demonstrated that the
primary cluster of influenza (H7N9) overlapped with previ-
ous H5N1 human infections.25 Changes over time in poultry
trade and LBM network in terms of extent and volume areTable 2 Market level biosecurity indicators associated with “ty
Market level biosecurity indicators Type of LBMs
Retail
N (row%, col%)
Whole
Sell poultry to other LBMs
No 9 (81.8, 100) 0 (0,
Yes 0 (0, 0) 6 (46.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Sell poultry directly to consumers
No 1 (16.7, 11.1) 4 (66.
Yes 8 (44.4, 88.9) 2 (11.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Type of poultry sold
Live birds only 0 (0, 0) 5 (62.
Live and slaughtered poultry 9 (56.3, 100) 1 (6.3
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Sell live ducks
No 3 (23.1, 33.3) 2 (15.
Yes 6 (54.6, 66.7) 4 (36.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Waste hauled in trash
No 1 (9.1, 11.1) 3 (27.
Yes 8 (61.5, 88.9) 3 (23.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Market disinfection
No 4 (57.1, 44.4) 1 (14.
Every 1e2 days 5 (62.5, 55.6) 1 (12.
Every 3e14 days 0 (0, 0) 4 (44.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
Market closure
No 9 (52.9, 100) 4 (23.
Yes 0 (0, 0) 2 (28.
Total 9 (37.5, 100) 6 (25,
a Statistically significant.likely to occur and could lead to this high-risk area to shift
geographically.17 However, since the third wave of H7N9
infection, there have been 18 human H7N9 outbreaks in
Jiangsu province which are well within the highly con-
nected area identified in this study suggesting that our find-
ings are robust to the known changes in poultry trade
pattern which occur across the year (Data was derivedpe of LBMs”.
sale Mixed Total Fisher’s
exact test
0.0a
0) 2 (18.2, 22.2) 11 (100, 45.8)
2, 100) 7 (53.9, 77.8) 13 (100, 54.2)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.047a
7, 66.7) 1 (16.7, 11.1) 6 (100, 25)
1, 33.3) 8 (44.4, 88.9) 18 (100, 75)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.013a
5, 83.3) 3 (37.5, 33.3) 8 (100, 33.3)
, 16.7) 6 (37.5, 66.7) 16 (100, 66.7)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.039a
4, 33.3) 8 (61.5, 88.9) 13 (100, 45.8)
4, 66.7) 1 (9.1, 11.1) 11 (100, 100)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.016a
3, 50) 7 (63.6, 77.8) 11 (100, 45.8)
1, 50) 2 (15.4, 22.2) 13 (100, 54.2)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.043a
3, 16.7) 2 (28.6, 22.2) 7 (100, 33.3)
5, 16.7) 2 (25, 22.2) 8 (100, 37.5)
4, 66.7) 5 (55.6, 55.6) 9 (100, 100)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
0.028a
5, 66.7) 4 (23.5, 44.4) 17 (100, 70.8)
6, 33.3) 5 (71.4, 55.6) 7 (100, 29.2)
100) 9 (37.5, 100) 24 (100, 100)
Table 3 Market level biosecurity indicators associated with “selling poultry to other LBMs”.
Market level biosecurity indicator Selling poultry to other LBMs
No
N (row%, col%)
Yes Total Fisher’s
exact test
Type of poultry sold 0.001a
Live poultry only 0 (0, 0) 8 (100, 61.5) 8 (100, 33.3)
Live and slaughtered poultry 11 (68.8, 100) 5 (41.7, 38.5) 16 (100, 16.7)
Total 11 (45.8, 100) 13 (54.2, 100) 24 (100, 100)
Waste hauled in trash 0.019a
No 2 (18.2, 18.2) 9 (81.8, 69.2) 11 (100, 45.8)
Yes 9 (69.2, 81.8) 4 (30.8, 30.8) 13 (100, 54.2)
Total 11 (45.8, 100) 13 (54.17, 100) 24 (100, 100)
Market disinfection 0.031a
No 5 (71.4, 45.5) 2 (28.6, 15.48) 7 (100, 29.2)
Every 1e2 days 5 (62.5, 45.5) 3 (37.5, 23.1) 8 (100, 33.3)
Every 3e14 days 1 (11.1, 9.1) 8 (88.9, 61.5) 9 (100, 37.5)
Total 11 (45.8, 100) 13 (54.2, 100) 24 (100, 100)
Market closures 0.078
No 10 (58.8, 90.9) 7 (41.2, 53.9) 17 (100, 70.8)
Yes 1 (14.3, 9.1) 6 (85.7, 46.2) 7 (100, 29.2)
Total 11 (45.8, 100) 13 (54.2, 100) 24 (100, 100)
a Statistically significant.
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face/avian_influenza/archive/en/). Taken together these
findings suggest that the areas identified in our study are
of high importance in terms of the epidemiology of influ-
enza A (H7N9). Therefore, continuous surveillance of
poultry trade activities should in place in the areas identi-
fied in our study. There is also a need to design and conduct
more detailed empirical studies in the provinces of Anhui
and Jiangsu to understand live poultry movement data at
different points of the poultry marketing chain and inte-
grate that information with data from risk perception and
attitudes towards biosecurity of actors in the poultry mar-
ket chain, particularly poultry farmers, intermediary
traders and consumers.
In our previous studies in South China we reported that
LBMs with a poor level of biosecurity could play an
important role in the dissemination of infected poultry
should they be marketed through their network.18 Other
studies have shown that the prevalence of particular avian
influenza viruses in retail LBMs is twice as high as the prev-
alence in wholesale LBMs.26,27 However, our results have
shown that in the case of H7N9, the market level infection
was significantly associated with wholesale and mixed LBMs
compared to retail markets suggesting that particular bio-
security practices within wholesale and mixed LBMs may
be a good indicator for H7N9 presence. Initial reports had
proposed that visits to retail markets during the first wave
of H7N9 had posed humans at increased risk of H7N9 infec-
tion by facilitating the transmission of avian influenza vi-
ruses due to lower biosecurity levels and increased access
by consumers.28 Our results indicate that retail markets
were mostly a dead-end for the live chicken trade (i.e.
selling poultry directly to the consumer) while all the sur-
veyed wholesale markets reported sending poultry to other
LBMs In addition, all retail markets reported selling both
live and slaughtered poultry while over eighty percent ofthe wholesale markets reported selling live poultry only.
Our study also demonstrates the important role that poultry
trade profile can have on market positivity to H7N9 in that
the presence of H7N9 infection was associated with LBMs
that sell live poultry to other LBMs. The results also indicate
that LBMs that sell live poultry to other LBMs tended to
have insufficient disinfection and cleaning measures and
no proper market closure practices.
In our study, eighty-nine percent of the retail markets
reported having their waste hauled in the trash while two
thirds of wholesale and mixed markets reported not having
their waste hauled in the trash. This corroborates the
findings in Indonesia where removal of waste contributed to
a reduction of HPAI (H5N1) in LBMs.29 In addition, eighty
percent of the wholesale and mixed markets surveyed in
our study reported infrequent disinfection practices (none
or every three or more days), and only forty-four percent
of the retail markets reported not disinfecting stalls. Previ-
ous studies have shown that daily cleaning and disinfection
are effective at reducing of AI virus in LBMs in southern
China and New York.18,30 Our results also reveal that all
the retail markets and two thirds of wholesale markets re-
ported that they did not perform market closure, while 56%
of mixed markets reported that they performed market clo-
sures. Studies have shown that the introduction of rest-day
in LBMs led to a significant decline in the isolation rate of
influenza virus (H9N2) in LBMs.31,32 Besides, the increase
in selling activities itself could be associated with a lapse
in the institution of hygienic measures or even worse the
selling of lower quality poultry material left unsold from
previous activities.13,33,34 Taken together these results sug-
gest that market biosecurity upgrading and restructuring
could have a significant impact on reducing the level of
infection and possibly interrupting the cycle of infection
persistence. Nevertheless, the relationship between live
bird market biosecurity indicators and the presence of
478 X. Zhou et al.H7N9 is likely to be much more complex and further evi-
dence is necessary to profile the risk of LBMs.
The findings of this study should be interpreted in light
of the study limitations. Firstly, this study was conducted
during an emergency response and the LBMs were selected
purposively aligned with the occurrence of H7N9 human
infections. Also while collecting the live poultry movement
data, only major LBM’s in the large cities in the four
provinces were surveyed which may have introduced po-
tential biases. Secondly, data on the presence of H7N9 in
LBMs was ascertained by available information from the
national emergency surveillance activities. Due to manda-
tory market closures in the study area, the H7N9 infection
status in several markets was not available. Due to the
insufficient sample size we were not able to include the
biosecurity indicators in a multivariable model nor were we
able to detect a significant independent effect of neither of
these indicators on H7N9 virus positivity in the LBMs.
Thirdly, while the cross-sectional design of our study allows
us to identify areas in China involved in poultry trade to
LBMs in close proximity to human H7N9 cases, it does not
allow us to conclusively explain how the virus emerged and
spread over time.
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that the connec-
tivity of LBMs to particular counties in the provinces of
Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangsu and the level of market
biosecurity of LBMs were likely to have played a role in
the transmission of H7N9 to humans during the first wave of
the epidemic in April 2013. Recently cases are being
reported in the areas identified in our study which empha-
sizes the need to improve our understanding of poultry
trading patterns within the counties identified.
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